We extend Cass and Stiglitz's analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation. We show that high degrees of fund separation can be constructed by adding inverse marginal utility functions exhibiting lower degrees of separation. However, this method does not allow us to find all utility functions satisfying fund separation. In general, we do not know how to write the primal utility functions in these models in closed form, but we can do so in the special case of SAHARA utility defined by Chen et al. and for a new class of GOBI preferences introduced here. We show that there is money separation (in which the riskless asset can be one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may not be the riskless asset) with a constant allocation as wealth changes. 
Introduction
Mutual fund separation is an important concept in portfolio selection. It means that all investors'optimal portfolio choices can be constructed as the linear combination of a set of mutual funds regardless of the initial wealth level, where a mutual fund can be any portfolio of tradable assets in the market. In other words, under mutual fund separation investors should be able to achieve the same level of utility from the individual assets as if they were only o¤ered a set of mutual funds. The term "separation" comes from the fact that every investor can "separate" his portfolio choice into two steps. First, the investor chooses a small set of funds that spans optimal portfolios of all wealth levels. Second, the investor determines the optimal mixture of the separating funds based on his current wealth level.
The …rst results of mutual fund separation are developed under the mean-variance framework. Tobin (1958) …nds that when investors only care about the mean and variance of the return distribution and in the presence of a riskless asset, optimal consumptions can be spanned by a risky portfolio and the riskless asset. He also shows Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis. E-mail: dybvig@wustl.edu. y School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University. E-mail: fang.liu@cornell.edu.
that the mean-variance assumption is consistent with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences with quadratic utility functions. Black (1972) proves that under meanvariance preferences, even in the absence of the riskless asset, similar two-fund separation results still hold with both separating funds being risky portfolios.
When agents do not have mean-variance preferences, some alternative assumption is needed to support mutual fund separation. Such conditions can be roughly classi…ed into two types: those in terms of investor preferences and those in terms of the distributions of asset returns. Among research examining preference-based separation, Pye (1967) and Hakansson (1969) …nd that the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class exhibits two-fund separation with one of the separating funds being the riskless asset. Cass and Stiglitz (1970) further characterize the class of preferences that permits mutual fund separation, regardless of the distributions of asset returns.
On the return distribution side, e¤orts have been made to delineate the class of stochastic processes that supports separation for all utility functions. Samuelson (1967) shows that if asset payo¤s are independent and identically distributed, all risk-averse agents will choose the equally-weighted portfolio, and more generally Ross (1978) derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the stochastic structure of asset returns such that mutual fund separation can be sustained, independent of investor preferences.
In this paper, we extend Cass and Stiglitz's analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation. While Cass and Stiglitz mostly focus on one-and two-fund separation, we emphasize the general K-fund separation. 1 We provide a complete characterization of the general K-fund separation in terms of the inverse marginal utility function. We show that high-degree separation can be constructed by adding low-degree separating preferences in the inverse marginal utility function. However, this method does not allow us to …nd all utility functions satisfying fund separation.
We also study money separation in which we can choose the riskless asset as one of the separating funds. We show that money separation holds if and only if there is a fund (the riskless asset or a risky portfolio) whose optimal allocation is constant and does not depend on initial wealth. While it is generally hard, if not impossible, to 1 Cass and Stiglitz (1970) do have a result on high-degree separation, their confusing Theorem 7.1, which is presented without proof. Unfortunately, this is a weak point in a great paper, and seems to be incorrect if only because the trigonometric terms are missing. Given the Remark after the statement of the theorem and the discussion in footnote 1 in Appendix II, it seems to be assumed that the trigonometric terms are ruled out in general by concavity, like they are for one-and two-fund separation.
write the utility function of a separating preference in closed form, we show that this can be achieved for two special classes of preferences, both of which exhibit three-fund separation. We also make a minor contribution to the theory of one-and two-fund separation. Mirror CRRA preferences have a functional form like constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, but are de…ned on negative wealth. We also consider two-fund separating preferences constructed from mirror CRRA preferences, perhaps in combination with CRRA preferences.
The study of mutual fund separation has important implications. If we have reasons to believe that K-fund separation holds, where K is a relatively small number, then a money manager could set up a relatively small set of commingled portfolios, active or passive according to the manager's style, to serve all clients at all levels of wealth. The optimal combination of these commingled portfolios would deliver the same payo¤ and therefore the same level of utility as individualized portfolios constructed optimally from the individual assets for each client. In other words, we could set up the K separating funds as index funds in a fund family, and these funds are all that an investor would ever need to trade.
It is also useful to study mutual fund separation because it helps to motivate new tractable functional forms of utility functions. In many important …nance problems such as portfolio selection and asset pricing, fund separation often simpli…es the analysis. While most existing work focuses on one-and two-fund separation, we show that higher degrees of separation are rich and interesting but still tractable.
We consider a one-period setting: investors with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences invest at the beginning of the period and consume at the end. Given complete markets with a unique stochastic discount factor, the optimal consumption portfolio is determined by the …rst order condition, which says that the marginal utility at optimum is proportional to the stochastic discount factor. Strict concavity then enables us to invert the marginal utility function and express the optimal portfolio as the inverse marginal utility evaluated at the stochastic discount factor multiplied by the shadow price which depends on the initial wealth level. This approach allows us to prove a general characterization of preference-based K-fund separation in terms of the inverse marginal utility, which includes K-fund separating preferences that can be generated by combining one-fund separating preferences, as well as some that cannot. Various examples allow us to explore how this works.
Following Cass and Stiglitz (1970) , we say there is money separation if there is separation and one of the funds can be chosen to be the riskless asset. We show that money separation holds if and only if we can choose a separating fund whose optimal investment weight is constant and independent of the initial wealth level. Interestingly, the constant weight can be assigned to either the riskless asset (e.g., quadratic utility) or a risky fund (e.g., constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility). In addition, we also show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility function. A non-money separating utility function can be converted into a money separating utility function by adding a constant to the inverse marginal utility, or equivalently through a translation of consumption, as when we go from CRRA utility to HARA utility with the same exponent.
The characterization of separating utility functions gives the inverse marginal utility in closed form. From this, we can derive the utility function itself by …rst inverting the inverse marginal utility to obtain the marginal utility, and then integrating the marginal utility to obtain the utility function. This is easy numerically, but unfortunately does not yield a closed-form expression except in a few special cases. Aside from the one-and two-fund separating cases already in the literature, we discuss two cases with closed-form expressions for the utility function. One is the symmetric asymptotic hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (SAHARA) preferences proposed by Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011), and another is the GOBI preferences to be introduced in this paper. Both classes exhibit three-fund separation, and they have not only a simple form in the inverse marginal utility, but a closed-form expression in the utility function itself.
Concavity imposes additional constraints on our characterization of separation.
A separating utility function is strictly concave if and only if the inverse marginal utility is monotonically decreasing everywhere. 2 It is hard to derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for strict concavity in terms of the parameter values, something similar to …nding conditions for a polynomial to be positive everywhere. Nonetheless, we analyze speci…c examples and we give su¢ cient conditions to be inconsistent with any strictly concave utility function.
Finally, we extend our analyses from the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility to a broader set of Machina preferences. According to Machina (1982) , when the utility function is smooth enough, these preferences can be locally modeled as expected utility. We show that if the local utility function satis…es fund separation everywhere with the same set of separating funds, this is su¢ cient but not necessary for global fund separation. We illustrate this using examples.
In this paper, we follow Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and consider complete markets only. In general, separation need not hold under conditions of the theorems when markets are incomplete, with some known exceptions in the literature. Hakansson (1969) shows that one-fund separation still holds for logarithm and power utility even if markets are incomplete, and in the presence of a riskless asset, the HARA class exhibits two-fund separation even if markets are incomplete. Black (1972) shows that quadratic utility satis…es two-fund separation under incomplete markets even without a riskless asset. Beyond this short list of known examples, the su¢ cient conditions provided in this paper are no longer su¢ cient if markets are incomplete, and we can construct numerical examples where two-fund separation fails when markets are incomplete. 3 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 de…nes mutual fund separation and characterizes the class of separating preferences in terms of the inverse marginal utility function. We also demonstrate how low-degree separation can be used to construct high-degree separating preferences. Section 3 studies money separation. Section 4 derives the utility functions for the SAHARA and GOBI preferences, both of which exhibit three-fund separation. Section 5 examines conditions for strict concavity and discusses how they can be used to re…ne the separating class. Section 6 discusses su¢ cient conditions for fund separation for Machina preferences. Section 7 concludes the paper. Some intuitive proofs are included in the main text, while other proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Mutual Fund Separation
In this section, we study necessary and su¢ cient conditions for preference-based Kfund separation.
Setup
Following Cass and Stiglitz (1970), we consider a one-period model, in which investors invest at the beginning of the period and consume at the end. Assume that markets are complete and there exists a unique stochastic discount factor > 0 that takes all positive values with E ( ) < 1. We also use to represent realizations of the random stochastic discount factor. Assume that each investor has a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function u ( ) de…ned on any open interval D R, which is twice di¤erentiable with u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0: We allow for both positive and negative consumption levels. 4 We denote the set of utility functions of all investors by U.
Then, an investor with utility function u 2 U and initial wealth w 0 2 R solves the following utility maximization problem.
subject to the budget constraint
We denote the set of solutions to Problem 1 by S (u; w 0 ) : By strict concavity of u; S (u; w 0 ) is either an empty set or a singleton. Assume that for all utility functions under consideration, there exists an open interval for the initial wealth such that an optimum to Problem 1 exists, i.e., S (u; w 0 ) 6 = ?: Now we de…ne K-fund separation if there are no fewer than K mutual funds whose random payo¤s span the optimal consumptions of all investors whenever an optimum exists, regardless of the initial wealth level.
De…nition 1
We have K-fund separation if K is the smallest positive integer such that there exist K mutual funds ff k ( )g k=1;:::;K , which satisfy that for all u 2 U and w 0 2 R, if S (u; w 0 ) 6 = ?; then we can …nd f k (u; w 0 )g k=1;:::;K such that
Several comments are worth pointing out. First, the optimal consumptions and the separating funds are both identi…ed in terms of payo¤, whereas the associated portfolio compositions may not be uniquely determined in the presence of redundant assets. Second, whenever K-fund separation holds for K 2, the set of separating funds is not unique. Indeed, having one set of separating funds, we can easily construct another by taking linear combinations of the original set of funds, and the resulting investment weights are also linear combinations of the original weights. Finally, while K-fund separation is de…ned for a set of utility functions, we are often interested in K-fund separation for a single utility function as a special case, which is obtained when U contains one utility function only.
One special form of mutual fund separation obtains when we can choose the riskless asset as one of the separating funds. We follow Cass and Stiglitz (1970) To characterize utility functions exhibiting mutual fund separation, we solve Problem 1. Suppose a solution exists, then the …rst order condition implies that the optimal consumption portfolio is given by
where I = (u 0 ) 1 is the inverse marginal utility function, and > 0 is the shadow price whose value depends on the initial wealth level w 0 . Since u 00 < 0; it is apparent that I exists and is unique. Preferences are unchanged by an increasing a¢ ne transformation of the utility function u or equivalently by the rescaling of the argument of the inverse marginal utility function I: We will not distinguish di¤erent utility functions or inverse marginal utility functions that represent the same preferences.
If the utility function u satis…es K-fund separation, then the optimal consumption
(1) can be written as the weighted sum of K mutual funds, with the associated weights depending on the initial wealth w 0 and thus on the shadow price ; i.e.,
Notice that to ensure non-degeneracy, we must have that the separating funds f k ( ) are linearly independent, and that the associated investment weights k ( ) are also linearly independent. Otherwise, the degree of separation can always be reduced by combining two or more funds to form a larger separating fund. In addition, for tractability, we only consider cases in which k ( ) are analytic functions. 6 
Some Examples
Before we formally characterize the set of separating preferences, let us …rst look at a few examples. Some of the following examples involve very well-known preferences, while others are less so. One might wonder how we come up with the more obscure examples. In fact, these examples are motivated by the general characterization of separating preferences to be introduced in the next section.
Example 1 (CRRA utility) Consider the CRRA utility function
de…ned on all x 2 (0; +1) ; where R is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The inverse marginal utility function is given by
we know from (2) that the CRRA utility function exhibits one-fund separation with separating fund
and corresponding investment weight
Hence, an investor with CRRA utility would always …nd it optimal to invest his entire wealth into a single mutual fund 1 R ; regardless of the initial wealth level.
Example 2 (Quadratic utility) Consider the quadratic utility function
where x < b: The inverse marginal utility function is given by
the quadratic utility function exhibits two-fund money separation with separating funds
and corresponding investment weights
Hence, an investor with quadratic utility would optimally invest a …xed amount b into the riskless asset and take a wealth-dependent short position in the risky portfolio . 
the SAHARA utility function exhibits two-fund separation with separating funds
Hence, an investor with SAHARA utility would always …nd it optimal to take a long position in fund Example 4 (CARA utility) Consider the CARA utility function
with the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion A > 0: The inverse marginal utility function is given by
Since
the CARA utility function exhibits two-fund money separation with separating funds
Hence, an investor with CARA utility would always …nd it optimal to invest a wealthdependent amount into the riskless asset and take a constant short position in the risky portfolio log .
In all four examples above, whenever a power term shows up in the inverse marginal utility function, always takes real values. However, this does not have to be the case. When we have a pair of complex power values bi, bi can be transformed into cos (b log ) and sin (b log ) : The following example demonstrates that these terms can also appear in a separating preference.
Example 5 Consider a utility function u, whose inverse marginal utility is given by
It can be veri…ed that I 0 ( ) < 0 (corresponding to concavity of utility) and
Hence, we have three-fund separation with separating funds
General Characterization of K-Fund Separation
In this section, we provide a general characterization of preference-based K-fund separation. Our characterization is stated in terms of the inverse marginal utility function I: We show that the inverse marginal utility of a separating preference can only have the following terms:
and (log ) l sin (b log ) : Indeed, we have already seen many of these terms in the examples above.
The following theorem provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for K-fund separation, where K 1 can be any positive integer. This characterization is similar to Theorem 7.1 in Cass and Stiglitz (1970), although their result is stated without proof and seems to be incorrect if only because the trigonometric terms are missing.
Their result also seems to contain terms that should not be there. However, the remark to the theorem describes an additional restriction which rules out at least some of the extra terms.
Theorem 1 A utility function u (with u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0) exhibits K-fund separation if and only if the inverse marginal utility function I = (u 0 ) 1 can be expressed as
where (1) The ordered pairs ( k ; b k ) are distinct for each k with b k 0;
(2) For i = 1; 2; P k;i (log ) is a polynomial function of log of degree d k;i 0, 
indicator function that takes a value of 1 when b k 6 = 0 and 0 otherwise.
The separating funds can be chosen as follows: 8k = 1; 2; ; J and 8l = 0; 1;
when b k = 0; and
when b k 6 = 0:
The associated investment weights are given by
Proof of Theorem 1 (sketch): Here is a sketch of the proof, which focuses on the necessity of (3). The complete formal proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Since the utility function u exhibits K-fund separation, we must have that (2) holds whenever a solution to Problem 1 exists. Taking derivatives of (2) with respect to yields 0
where I (k) ( ) denotes the k th derivative of I ( ) ; and M 0 ( ) is de…ned as
1 ( )
Assume for now that M 0 ( ) is non-singular for some ; i.e., 9 such that
exists. We show in the appendix that a simple trick allows us to tackle the singularity case for which similar results obtain. When M 0 ( ) is not singular, we have 0
Plugging (11) back into (2) gives
Without loss of generality, assume that (M 0 ( )) 1 exists when = 1: Evaluating (12) at = 1 and rearranging yield a di¤erential equation of the form
where A 1 ; A 2 ; ; A K are constants. To ensure non-degenerate K-fund separation, we must have A K 6 = 0. Then, (13) is a K th -order homogeneous Euler di¤erential equation.
To solve this di¤erential equation, we conjecture I ( ) = and plug this into (13) . This gives us the following K th -order polynomial equation
with K roots. Some of these K roots may be repeated, thus reducing to J K
, each of which can be either real (b k = 0) or complex (b k 6 = 0). If a real root k is repeated for d k + 1 times (d k = 0 means that the root is not repeated), it gives rise to d k + 1 terms
times, it then generates k P k;1 (log ) cos (b k log ) and k P k;2 (log ) sin (b k log ) in
To ensure that the total number of roots is equal to K; we must have
Combining all the above terms, we have that I ( ) takes the form of (3).
While (3) seems complicated, it is indeed a concise way to incorporate all possible terms in I listed at the beginning of the section. The following table summarizes di¤erent possible terms in I and the corresponding parameter values.
Possible terms in
The characterization of K-fund separation for a class of preferences U follows almost immediately from Theorem 1. The inverse marginal utility of each u 2 U must be the sum of terms as in (3), and the leading coe¢ cient on each of these terms must be non-zero for some utility functionû 2 U to ensure non-degeneracy. Formally, we have the following corollary. (1) For i = 1; 2; P k;i (log ( )) is a polynomial function of log ( ) of degree d k;i 1: When d k;i = 1; P k;i (log ( )) is an empty sum, which we take to be uniformly equal to zero;
(2) If b k = 0 (the sin terms disappear, but the cos terms do not), then d k;2 = 1;
Mutual fund separation for a class of preferences is very similar to that for a single utility function. Hence, we focus on fund separation for a single utility function in the analyses below.
From Low-Degree to High-Degree Separation
Theorem 1 provides a simple way of constructing higher-degree separating preferences from those with lower degrees. We now state it below.
Theorem 2 Consider N utility functions fu n g N n=1 with corresponding inverse marginal utility given by fI n g N n=1 : Suppose that each u n exhibits K n -fund separation. De…ne another utility function u; whose inverse marginal utility is given by
for some non-zero constants t 1 ; t 2 ; ; t N : Then, u satis…es K-fund separation with
where the equality holds if the separating funds of all u n are linearly independent.
Proof of Theorem 2: For each n; since u n exhibits K n -fund separation, there must exist ff n;k ( )g k and f n;k ( )g k such that
By (15), we thus have
This implies that u satis…es fund separation.
If all ff n;k ( )g n;k are linearly independent, then Theorem 1 implies that all f n;k ( )g n;k are also linearly independent. Hence, ff n;k ( )g n;k serve as a set of separating funds for u with the associated investment weights given by ft n n;k ( )g n;k ;
and the degree of separation is K = P N n=1 K n : If ff n;k ( )g n;k are linearly dependent, then multiple funds can be combined, which reduces the degree of separation, i.e.,
Theorem 2 implies that one can generate high-degree separating preferences by taking linear combinations of lower-degree ones in the inverse marginal utility function. One would wonder if this allows us to …nd the entire set of separating utility based on one-fund separation only. Unfortunately, this is not true, due to the existence of repeated and complex roots of (14) , which correspond to logarithm and trigonometric terms in the characterization (3). To illustrate this, it is useful to review one-and two-fund separation here.
One-Fund Separation
It is immediate from Theorem (1) that a utility function u exhibits one-fund separation if and only (14) has a single real root ; in which case the inverse marginal utility can be written as
for some constant C and R = 1= : Note that changing the sign of C changes preferences, while changing the magnitude without changing the sign only changes the scaling of the utility function and does not change preferences. Conditions for strict concavity are at least implicit in the literature (except perhaps for the mirror CRRA case discussed below), but we repeat them for completeness. Strict concavity
One can verify that the utility function for the one-fund separating preferences is
where the domain of consumption is x 2 (0; +1) when R > 0 and the domain is x 2 ( 1; 0) when R < 0: Notice that when R > 0 and C > 0, this corresponds to the CRRA utility function, which is de…ned on positive consumption levels, as in Example 1. When R < 0 and C < 0, we refer to this utility function as mirror CRRA preferences, since it has the same form as CRRA but is de…ned on negative wealth.
Two-Fund Separation
If a utility function u exhibits two-fund separation, then Theorem (1) implies that there are potentially four di¤erent types of cases, only three of which are consistent with concavity, and only one of which can be constructed by combining one-fund separating preferences.
Case 1: When (14) has two non-zero distinct real roots, 1 and 2 , (3) is equivalent to
where R 1 = 1= 1 6 = R 2 = 1= 2 ; and C 1 and C 2 are arbitrary constants such that Case 2: When (14) has two distinct real roots, 0 and , (3) is equivalent to
where R = 1= ; and C 1 and C 2 are arbitrary constants such that C 1 6 = 0 and C 2 =R > 0. This can be viewed as the limit of Case 1 when one of the risk aversion levels goes to in…nity. An example of this is quadratic utility (Example 2), obtained by adding a constant to a mirror CRRA preference in the inverse marginal utility.
All utility functions of this form are in the HARA class and have money separation (see Section 3). These preferences cannot be derived by combining preferences with one-fund separation, except as a limiting case.
Case 3: When (14) has two repeated real roots, (3) is equivalent to
for some constants C 1 and C 2 : Strict concavity implies = 0 (see Proposition 2 of Section 5), so we must have
which is CARA utility u (x) = e Ax with A = 1=C 2 > 0 (see Example 4). This case cannot be derived by combining preferences with one-fund separation, because the logarithm term never shows up in one-fund separation.
Case 4:
When (14) has a pair of complex roots, (3) is equivalent to
with constants b 6 = 0; C 1 and C 2 : We will show in Proposition 2 of Section 5 that this form cannot exist under strict concavity.
While the trigonometric terms cannot appear in one-or two-fund separation, they can appear in higher-degree separation, as in Example 5.
Money Separation
Money separation is a special case of mutual fund separation, which obtains when we can choose the riskless asset as one of the separating funds. Examples of money separation we have encountered so far include quadratic (Example 2) and CARA (Example 4) preferences. In this section, we discuss money separation and its properties in greater depth.
Money Separation and Constant Investment Weight
An interesting observation is that for the quadratic and CARA preferences, both of which exhibit money separation, the optimal investment strategy always involves assigning a constant weight (dollar amount) to one of the separating funds, regardless of the initial wealth level. In particular, for the quadratic case, the constant weight is assigned to the riskless asset, whereas a CARA investor optimally assigns a constant weight to a risky fund. A natural question is whether this is merely a coincidence or it actually reveals a property of money separation. The following theorem answers this question.
Theorem 3 A separating utility function exhibits money separation if and only if the optimal investment portfolio can be constructed by assigning a constant amount to one separating fund, regardless of the initial wealth.
Proof of Theorem 3:
It is our task to show that having the riskless asset in the span of the separating funds is equivalent to being able to choose a separating fund with a constant investment. We will show that both are equivalent to having a root of equation (14) with ( k ; b k ) = (0; 0) :
By Theorem 1, if a utility function u exhibits mutual fund separation, then the separating funds can be chosen as
when b k = 0, or 
when b k = 0; and 
Hence, the theorem is proven.
According to Theorem 3, for a money separating preference, the optimal investment strategy can be constructed by assigning a constant amount to one of the separating funds. Interestingly, the fund with the constant weight can be either the riskless asset or a risky fund. As shown in the above proof, the riskless asset corresponds to ( k ; b k ) = (0; 0) and l = 0; whereas the constant investment weight is assigned to the separating fund with ( k ; b k ) = (0; 0) and l = d k;1 : Therefore, the riskless asset receives a constant weight if and only if ( k ; b k ) = (0; 0) and d k;1 = 0;
i.e., (14) has a non-repeated zero root, as in the case of quadratic utility. When the zero root is repeated, as for CARA utility, then the riskless asset receives a wealthdependent investment weight, and the constant weight is assigned to a risky fund.
Money Separation and Shifts in Utility
In this section, we show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility function. Indeed, we can construct money separating preferences from non-money separation by introducing a shift in the utility function. This is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4
Suppose that a utility function u exhibits K-fund non-money separation.
De…neû (x) = u (x C 0 ) for an arbitrary constant C 0 6 = 0: Then,û satis…es (K + 1)-fund money separation.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Sinceû
one can verify that the associated inverse marginal utility satis…eŝ
Thus, introducing a shift to the utility function is equivalent to adding a constant term in the inverse marginal utility.
If u exhibits K-fund non-money separation, then there exist k ( ) and f k ( ) for k = 1; 2; ; K such that
where none of f k ( ) or any of their linear combination equals a constant, and none of k ( ) or any of their linear combination equals a constant.
From (26) and (27), we havê
Hence,û exhibits (K + 1)-fund money separation with the K + 1 separating funds given by ff k ( )g k and 1, and the associated investment weights given by f k ( )g k and C 0 .
To demonstrate how Theorem 4 works, it is useful to consider the one-fund separating preferences
whose inverse marginal utility function is given by
By introducing a shift to the utility function, we obtain the HARA clasŝ
with inverse marginal utility function
We have seen in Section 2.4.2 that these preferences satisfy two-fund money separation when C 0 6 = 0. Hence, we obtain two-fund money separating preferences by introducing a non-zero shift to the one-fund separating utility function.
It is worth mentioning that money separation obtained this way always assigns a constant weight to the riskless asset. As discussed in Section 3.1, this is only one of the two possible cases of money separation. The other case in which the constant weight is assigned to a risky fund cannot be obtained using this approach.
Closed-Form Utility Functions
We have characterized the set of separating preferences in terms of the inverse marginal utility function. We then ask whether we are able to derive the associated utility function. A natural way to do this is by …rst inverting I to obtain u 0 ; and then integrating u 0 to obtain u: Unfortunately, however, this does not yield a closed-form expression except in a few special cases, with those already in the literature limited to one-and two-fund separation (e.g., CRRA, CARA and quadratic utility, etc.).
In this section, we discuss two classes of three-fund money separating preferences, SAHARA and GOBI utility, for which closed-form expressions of the utility function exist.
SAHARA Utility
The SAHARA preferences are proposed by Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011). The standard SAHARA utility is de…ned on the entire real line R and has an inverse marginal utility function of the form
with a; b > 0: As shown in Example 3, these preferences exhibit two-fund non-money separation.
More generally, we allow for a shift in the SAHARA utility function, which is equivalent to adding a constant term to the inverse marginal utility, i.e.,
The constant C 0 is referred to as the default point in Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011), and the standard form obtains by setting C 0 = 0: We know from Theorem 4 that when C 0 6 = 0; the shifted SAHARA utility exhibits three-fund money separation.
The separating funds can be chosen as
with the corresponding investment weights given by
One nice property of the SAHARA utility is that the two power terms in the inverse marginal utility, 
which can be viewed as a quadratic equation of (u 0 (x)) 1 a : Since u 0 (x) > 0; we focus on positive solutions to (30). Using the properties of quadratic equations, we can verify that (30) has a unique positive solution given by
where G (x) = x C 0 : Integrating u 0 (x) then gives us the utility function
GOBI Utility
De…ne the class of GOBI preferences, whose inverse marginal utility function takes the form
where ; C 1 and C 2 are non-zero constants such that C 1 < 0 and C 2 < 0 for concavity. As for the SAHARA class, we include a constant C 0 in the inverse marginal utility to capture potential shifts in the utility function. As opposed to the SAHARA utility, which is de…ned on the entire real line, the GOBI utility is de…ned on a half real line. In particular, the domain is x 2 (C 0 ; +1) when < 0; and the domain is
It is easy to verify that when C 0 6 = 0; the GOBI preferences have three-fund money separation. The separating funds can be chosen as
When C 0 = 0; this reduces to two-fund non-money separation.
As for the SAHARA class, (31) can be viewed as a quadratic equation of :
Setting I ( ) = x and = u 0 (x) ; we can rewrite (31) as
Since u 0 (x) > 0; we focus on positive solutions to (32). Using the properties of quadratic equations, we can verify that (32) has a unique positive solution given by
where
Integrating u 0 (x) then gives us the utility function
Strict Concavity
We have so far assumed that all utility functions under consideration are strictly concave, i.e., u 00 < 0: This condition allows us to characterize the set of separating preferences by (3) in terms of the inverse marginal utility. However, not all functions satisfying (3) are strictly concave for all parameter values. In this section, we study strict concavity of separating preferences and how it can be used to narrow down our separating class.
Strict concavity is equivalent to I 0 ( ) 0 on the relevant range. Given the functional form of our separating class (3), the zeros of I 0 ( ) can only be isolated.
While the necessary and su¢ cient condition for strict concavity turns out to be straightforward for one-and two-fund separation, it can become very complicated, if not impossible, when higher-degree separation is taken into account. To see this,
consider as an example a K-fund separating preference whose inverse marginal utility takes the form
with non-zero C k . A su¢ cient condition for concavity is that C k k < 0 for all k; but this condition is not necessary. In (33), I ( ) is like a polynomial (and is a polynomial if all k are integer multiples of the same number). For a polynomial, the utility function is concave if I 0 ( ) is negative somewhere and all positive roots of I 0 ( ) have even order. Even …nding the roots is a hard problem for which there is no simple characterization. Other cases combining power terms with trigonometric functions and/or logarithms are even harder. Therefore, it seems impossible to come close to a complete characterization of concavity.
Despite the intrinsic challenge in providing a necessary and su¢ cient characterization, below we seek to identify some necessary conditions on the parameter values that are needed to induce strict concavity. While these conditions are not su¢ cient, they allow us to narrow down the class of separating preferences by ruling out parameter values and forms of the inverse marginal utility that are not permitted.
The next proposition deals with the special case of fund separation, in which the inverse marginal utility is given by the sum of power terms only.
Proposition 1 Consider a separating preference, whose inverse marginal utility is given by
with non-zero C 1 ; C 2 ; ; C K and non-zero 1 ; 2 ; ; K such that 1 < 2 < < K : Then, strict concavity implies C 1 1 < 0 and C K K < 0.
The following proposition further rules out forms of the inverse marginal utility that violate strict concavity.
Proposition 2
If a separating utility function is strictly concave, then its inverse marginal utility I cannot take the following forms.
I ( ) = P (log )
; where the polynomial function P ( ) is of an even degree;
2. I ( ) = P (log ) ; where 6 = 0 and the polynomial function P ( ) is of an odd degree;
; where
While preferences with an inverse marginal utility function of the forms listed in Proposition 2 violate strict concavity, more complex I ( ) including these terms can be concave. In fact, we have seen in Example 5 that the trigonometric terms can be consistent with strict concavity when additional terms are present. We further illustrate how to construct functional forms and choose parameter values to meet strict concavity using the following examples.
Example 6 Consider a three-fund separating preference, whose inverse marginal utility function is given by
with non-zero and C 3 : Di¤ erentiating I yields
Since 1 > 0, in order to have I 0 ( ) 0 we only need 8 > 0;
Notice that the left-hand side can be viewed as a quadratic function of log : As a result, this inequality holds if and only if
and
Therefore, any set of parameter values satisfying the above two conditions (e.g., =
1; C 1 = 3; C 2 = 2; C 3 = 1) would give rise to a strictly concave separating utility function.
Example 7 Consider a three-fund separating preference, whose inverse marginal utility function is given by
with non-zero 1 ; 2 ; C 2 ; C 3 and 1 6 = 2 : Di¤ erentiating I yields
Since 2 1 > 0; the sign of I 0 ( ) depends on that of
We will show that (i) when 1 < 2 ; 1 C 1 + C 2 < 0; and 1 C 2 > 0 (e.g., 1 = 1; 2 = 1; C 1 = 1; C 2 = 1); or (ii) when 1 > 2 ;
1 C 1 + C 2 < 0; and 1 C 2 < 0 (e.g., 1 = 1; 2 = 1; C 1 = 1; C 2 = 1), we can always set C 3 2 low enough such that I 0 ( ) < 0 holds for all > 0: We will show part (i) in detail only. The analysis for part (ii) is parallel.
Since 1 C 2 > 0; we have 1 C 2 1 2 log < 0 for all < 1 and 1 C 2 1 2 log 0 for all 1: Given 1 < 2 ; we know
2 log is continuous, (35) implies that 1 C 2 1 2 log must be bounded above. Then, setting C 3 2 equal to or lower than the negative value of this upper bound is enough to guarantee I 0 ( ) < 0 for all > 0; giving rise to a strictly concave utility function.
Machina Preferences
Our analyses so far have focused on von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, i.e., investors have expected utility. Machina (1982) shows that the von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences can actually be viewed as a special case of a larger class of preferences, which we call "Machina preferences". Assume that investors'utility is a function of consumption distribution only and is smooth in the sense of Fréchet di¤erentiability. 7 Machina proves that such utility functions are locally consistent with expected utility. In this section, we ask whether our fund separation results derived for expected utility can be extended to the Machina preferences.
Consider a Fréchet di¤erentiable utility function V ( ) de…ned over the distribution of consumption. Let x and x denote two random consumption portfolios with the corresponding cumulative distribution functions given by F and F : Suppose that F and F lie very close to each other. Machina (1982) shows
or equivalently,
where U (z; F ) is the local utility function over consumption level z evaluated at distribution F: Assume that U ( ; F ) is strictly concave for all F: It can be learned from (36) that the Machina preferences can be modeled locally as expected utility.
With Machina preferences, investors face the following utility maximization problem. 7 Fréchet di¤erentiability is an in…nite-dimensional version of di¤erentiability. The idea is that the utility function changes smoothly with the distribution of consumption. We are being informal about the topology used to de…ne the Fréchet derivative if consumption is not bounded. In Machina's original work (as in many derivations of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences), it is assumed that consumption is bounded. To formalized what we are doing for unbounded consumptions, we would have to specify the topology over distribution functions to de…ne the sense of approximation. Suppose that x solves Problem 2. Then, it must maximize (36) with local utility function U ( ; F ) evaluated at F : Fixing F ; both V (F ) and E [U (x ; F )] are constants. Therefore, x maximizes E [U (x; F )] : Given strict concavity of U ( ; F ) ;
x must be unique, and it also solves the following problem.
It seems that we are faced with a similar problem as in the case of von NeumannMorgenstern preferences. Apparently, if all local utility functions U ( ; F ) at all F satisfy fund separation with the same separation funds, then V ( ) exhibits fund separation globally. In fact, this condition is stronger than needed. The only thing we need is for all optimal consumption portfolios corresponding to all possible initial wealth levels to be spanned by the same set of separating funds. Since each optimal consumption portfolio corresponds to a di¤erent local utility function, we only need fund separation for each local utility function U ( ; F ) at the particular wealth level supporting F as the optimal consumption portfolio. Formally, let U F fU ( ; F ) ; 8F g denote the set of local utility functions U ( ; F ) evaluated at all possible F: Then, we have the following su¢ cient but not necessary condition for fund separation for Machina preferences. To illustrate fund separation for Machina preferences, we now provide two examples, one of which meets the su¢ cient condition of Theorem 5 and the other of which does not. However, we will see that both examples satisfy two-fund separation. The …rst example is the mean-variance preferences, which have originally been shown to satisfy two-fund money separation in Tobin (1958) .
Example 8 Consider the mean-variance preferences
with a > 0: This can equivalently be rewritten as
Di¤ erentiating V with respect to F gives the local utility function
Fixing any F; E (x) is a constant, and thus (37) is a quadratic function. This implies that the local utility functions at all F are quadratic. We already know from Example 2 that all quadratic utility funtions satisfy two-fund money separation with the same separating funds. It is then immediate from Theorem 5 that the mean-variance preferences exhibit two-fund money separation.
The mean-variance preferences assume that the only risk that investors are averse to is the variance of consumptions. As a second example, we incorporate an additional dimension of risk into the utility function, which is the downside risk de…ned as Example 9 Consider the mean-risk preferences
where risk has a variance component and a downside risk component with a; b > 0:
This can equivalently be rewritten as
where (F ) = R +1 x= 1 xdF is the expected consumption given distribution function F: Di¤ erentiating V with respect to F gives the local utility function
where 1 x< (F ) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if x < (F ) and 0 otherwise. Apparently, (37) does not belong to the class of separating utility functions characterized by (3) . Hence, in this case the local utility function does not satisfy fund separation.
While the su¢ cient condition in Theorem (5) fails, fund separation still holds in this case. To see this, taking the …rst order condition of (38) with respect to x subject to the budget constraint yields
Solving for the optimal consumption gives
It can be veri…ed that …xing the distribution of ; is a constant, whereas E (x ) depends on the initial wealth w 0 : Therefore, V (F ) satis…es two-fund money separation with separating funds
The corresponding investment weights are given by
2 (w 0 ) = 1:
Conclusion
This paper extends Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and studies the general preference-based K-fund separation. We provide a complete characterization of separating preferences in terms of the inverse marginal utility function and demonstrate our results using various examples. We show how a subset of high-degree separating preferences can be constructed by adding low-degree separation in the inverse marginal utility. We use one-and two-fund separation to illustrate cases that can be constucted this way and cases that cannot.
We also study money separation, for which we can choose the riskless asset as one of the separating funds. We show that money separation holds if and only if we can choose a separating fund whose optimal investment amount is constant and does not depend on the initial wealth. Somewhat surprisingly, the constant investment can be assigned to either the riskless asset or a risky fund. We show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility function. Starting with a non-money separating preference, one can construct money separation by introducing a non-zero shift in the utility function.
Our characterization provides us with a rich set of preferences satisfying fund separation and helps motivate new functional forms of utility functions that are tractable and have interesting properties. In particular, we provide two classes of three-fund separating preferences, SAHARA and GOBI, for which closed-form expressions of the utility function can be derived. These preference can be very useful for theoretical modeling and empirical tests in future research.
Appendix
As preparation for the formal proof of Theorem 1, we now review the concept of Wronkian, which is …rst introduced by Józef Hoene-Wronski (1812) and named by Thomas Muir (1882).
Let ( ) = ( 1 ( ) ; 2 ( ) ; ; K ( )) denote a vector of functions with all k ( ) de…ned over a real interval R with at least K 1 …nite continuous derivatives. Then the Wronskian of at is de…ned as
It is apparent that if ( ) is linearly dependent on ; we have W [ ] ( ) = 0 for all 2 : Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse does not hold true generally.
That is, the identical vanishing of the Wronskian does not necessarily imply linear dependence of ( ). Nevertheless, Bôcher (1900) shows that this is indeed true when all k ( ) are analytic functions. 
If M j ( ) is invertible at some for some j, we can follow the same procedure as in the sketch of the proof. Speci…cally, we solve for f k ( ) as functions of I ( ) and its derivatives, and plug them back into (2) . Rearranging terms and evaluating at = 1 (or at any positive value of where (M j ( )) 1 exists) give us a di¤erential equation of the form (13) . Then, solving (13) for I ( ) again leads to (3). Now suppose M j ( ) is not invertible at any for any j = 0; 1; ; K; i.e., jM j ( )j = 0 for all and j. Notice that jM j ( )j is the Wronskian of 
Strict concavity implies I 0 ( ) 0 for all > 0.
To show 1 C 1 < 0; it is useful to rewrite (43) as
Since 1 1 > 0, strict concavity requires 8 > 0;
Given 1 < 2 < < K ; we have that for all k = 2; 3; ; K;
This implies
Hence, to ensure I 0 ( ) 0 when approaches zero, we must have 1 C 1 < 0:
To show K C K < 0; it is useful to rewrite (43) as
Since K 1 > 0, strict concavity requires 8 > 0;
Given 1 < 2 < < K ; we have that for all k = 1; 2; ; K 1;
Hence, to ensure I 0 ( ) 0 when approaches in…nity, we must have K C K < 0:
Proof of Proposition 2: Our goal is to show that in each case we can …nd > 0 such that I 0 ( ) > 0:
Case 1: When P ( ) is of degree 0, then I ( ) is a constant, which clearly cannot happen.
When P ( ) is of an even degree d 2; we can rewrite I ( ) as
with C d 6 = 0. Di¤erentiating I yields (C k;1;j k + C k;2;j b k + C k;1;j+1 (j + 1)) cos (b k log ) (C k;1;j b k C k;2;j k C k;2;j+1 (j + 1)) sin (b k log ) (log ) which does not converge but instead switches between positive and negative values due to the cyclicality of the trigonometric terms. This implies that we can always …nd such that I 0 ( ) > 0; violating concavity.
